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WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE*-A REVIEW

John E. Tracyt

I

N r 8 87 John Henry Wigmore graduated from Harvard Law School.
Only four years later, in r89r, there came from his pen an article
in the Harvard Law Review entitled "Nemo Tenetur Seipsum Prodere," 1 which showed to the profession that there had arrived at the
bar a writer who was not only a deep student of legal history and
knew his law of evidence, but who had no hesitation in smashing images,
regardless of how sacredly they had theretofore been worshiped.
Good law review articles on evidence questions continued to come
from Mr. Wigmore's pen during the years succeeding, but it was not
until r 899 that he published his first book on that subject, being
Volume I of the sixteenth and final edition of Greenleaf on Evidence,
the other two volumes being edited by other authors. '¥ olume I brought
down to date that matter which was in the preceding editions of Greenleaf, and although it was considered a scholarly piece of editorial work,
its publication caused no great amount of comment in the profession.
In 1905, however, there appeared a work on evidence which did
occasion much discussion: the first edition of Wigmore.2 Arranged upon
novel lines, it showed the results of a tremendous amount of scholarly
research, a skillful assembling of materials, and a great deal of original
thought on the various subjects comprising that vast field of the law.
Practicing lawyers and law professors aEke acclaimed it to be the most
outstanding contribution that had yet been made to the literature in
that field, although there were the usual number of reviewers who
criticized its form, its arrangement, and certain of its statements of
legal doctrine.
The remainder of Mr. Wigmore's professional life since that time
has been principally devoted to further developing and keeping up to
date the material contained in that first edition of his work. In r 908,

*

A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
CoMMON LAw; including the Statutes and Judicial Decisions of all Jurisdictions of the
United States and Canada. (3d ed.) IO vols. By John Henry Wigmore-Professor of
the Law of Evidence, Northwestern University Law School; author "Principles of
Judicial Proof," "Panorama of the World's Legal Systems," etc. Boston: Little Brown
& Co. 1940. Pp. xcii, 722; xxx, 813; xxviii, 740; xxviii, 733; xxviii, 864; xxvi, 609;
xxvi, 665; xxvi, 850; xxvi, 615; 712 (indexes). $100.
Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-EJ.
1 5 HARV. L. REV. 71 (1891).
2 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, 4- vols., Little, Brown, and Company.
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he published a supplement to the first edition; in 1915, another supplement. In 1923, he brought out the famous second edition of his
work, this time in five volumes. In 1934, he published a lengthy supplement to the second edition. Now, in 1940, has come from the press
the third and final edition, for it is to be kept up to date in the future
by the recently developed pocket-part service. This third edition is
based upon and is a continuation of the former editions, so far as arrangement and section numbering are concerned, but the tremendous
growth of the work is illustrated by the fact that it now covers ten
volumes in place of five. The first edition contained some 40,000 citations of judicial decisions, the second edition, 55,000, and this third
edition contains :riot only 85,000 citations of judicial decisions but some
20,000 citations of statutes. The addition, in the 1934 supplement, of
more than sixty new topics for text discussion has now been increased
by twenty-six. The footnotes, which have always been voluminous,
in endeavoring to cite the decisions from every jurisdiction on the particular point discussed in the text, have also grown in volume by the
addition of the later citations, and they are now much more conveniently arranged for the reader's search, as the decisions from each jurisdiction are separately paragraphed, with the state name in italic type.
The indices are most comprehensive, comprising the whole of the tenth
volume of the work. There are 125 pages of index to statutes cited, 403
pages of index to cases cited, 15 I pages of index to topics discussed in
the text, and 2 5 pages of index to citations from other authors.
In reviewing the final edition of a textbook that has been in the
process of development for nearly forty years, it is interesting to reread
the critical reviews of the original edition,3 to remember the remarks
of the members of the practicing bar as to its deficiencies, and to see
what effect those criticisms have had upon the further development
of the work.
The original criticisms were of four different kinds:

( 1) The novel arrangement, which was radically different from
that of any previous textbook on that or on any other subject. For
example, it was pointed out that under the general heading of Relevancy was collected all the material under such large and differing
subjects as Circumstantial Evidence, Testimonial Evidence, and Real
Evidence.
8

L.

E.g., 18 HARV. L. REV. 479 (1905), 5 Coz.. L. REv. 68 (1905), 3 MrcH.
679 (1905).
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( 2) The invention and constant use by the author of new terms
which only he could define, e.g., "autoptic proferance," "prophylactic
rules," "viatorial privilege," "integration of legal acts," "retrospective
evidence," "analytic rules," "simplificative rules," "emotional capacity," etc.
(3) That as to certain principles of law, the author had made
statements that not only were not supported by judicial authority but
were not logically sound, e.g., that an extrajudicial admission by a party
to a cause is admissible only because it is impeaching in character ( §
1048); his use of the "past recollection" theory as being unduly complicated ( § 734); his statement that is is desirable that a physician
should be permitted to pronounce an opinion on information furnished
by the nurse of a patient (§ 688).
( 4) "Granted that it is a very learned treatise, you can't find anything in it." This was the complaint of the practitioners.
Talcing up, in turn, these four classes of criticisms, it is interesting
to see what effect they had upon the author and what experience has
shown as to their soundness.
The arrangement, though unusual, is a thing to which all consultants of the work have become accustomed, and one rarely now hears
that criticism.
The new nomenclature which Mr. Wigmore adopted and which
he uses so earnestly has not been generally accepted by the profession.
Lawyers still prefer "real evidence" to "autoptic proferance," "infancy"
to "mental immaturity," and "interest" and "marital relationship" to
"emotional capacity." Although certain of his new expressions, such as
the "circumstantial guaranty of trustworthiness" ( now changed to
"circumstantial probability of trustworthiness" [ § I 422]), as a basis
for receiving hearsay statements, have been quite generally adopted by
lawyers, the greater number of Mr. Wigmore's innovations in terminology have not extended beyond the covers of his book.
To certain of the criticisms as to the position taken by him on
specific questions of evidence, Mr. Wigmore has yielded in his later
editions. For example, he now agrees that an extrajudicial admission
of an opposing party to the cause has an affirmative probative value
(§ 1048), although, for reasons of consistency in arrangement, he continues to carry that subject matter under the original general heading
of "Testimonial Impeachment." On the other hand, he still adheres,
in this latest edition, to the position theretofore taken by him ( § I 3 85)
that, on preliminary rulings by a judge as to the admissibility of evi-
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dence, the ordinary rules of evidence do not apply, notwithstanding that
that position would seem to have been shown to be untenable by Messrs.
Maguire and Epstein in their article on that subject.4 On the whole, the
positions taken by Mr. Wigmore in 1905 which were, at that time,
considered so advanced that they would not be accepted by the courts,
have become the settled law of America today. Rarely has a legal work
accomplished so well the task of molding judicial thought to the principles there advocated.
The fourth general criticism, the one by the bar that one cannot find
anything in the book, is no longer heard. That criticism was due to two
things: the unusual arrangement and the fact that, whereas the practitioner had theretofore found in the work on evidence consulted by
him a categorical statement of what the rule is on a particular point,
here he had to read an historical discussion of the development of the
rule, the arguments for and against its soundness, and often not until
the end of the discussion the views of the author as to whether the
rule should be recognized and to what extent. The bar, however, have
now become accustomed to the unusual arrangement, and they have
learned not only how to find in the work the material that they are
after but to make intelligent use of it in briefs and arguments. There
is no question that it is now more cited than any textbook in the field
of law today, both in lawyers' briefs and in judicial opinions.
It is generally agreed to be the greatest work on evidence ever
written. This last edition has immeasurably improved upon the first
and the second. And yet the careful critic can still find in the work certain faults. For example, in his discussion of the parol evidence rule, the
author discusses ( § 2406) the problem of the execution of a document
merely as a sham, and he concludes, as seems proper to the reviewer,
that admissibility of evidence that this .was the purpose should be
limited to cases where the pretense was a morally justifiable one, as to
calm a lunatic or console a dying person. He cites certain decisions
sustaining the position taken by him and two or three cases contra
which he labels unsound, but he makes no mention of the more important cases contra and of the views of most law review commentators
and text writers in support of such contrary stand.5 To support his position he cites three New York Appellate Division decisions, but fails to
mention the more binding New York Court of Appeals decisions of
4

L.

J.

"Rules of Evidence in Preliminary Controversies as to Admissibility," 36
(1927).
5
See authorities cite~ in 33 M1cH. L. REV. 410 (1935).
IIOI
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Grierson v. Mason 6 and Bernstein v. Kritzer 1 to the contrary, which
unfortunate decisions have caused so much trouble in the law; and he
fails to mention the decision containing the strongest argument in support of the position taken by him, viz., Evans v. Dravo.8
In his discussion of the admissibility of statements made in negotiations for a compromise (§ ro6r), the author accepts the conventional
doctrine that, while offers of compromise may not be received in evidence, statements of fact made during such negotiations are admissible.
He supports his position by the application of certain legal propositions
to show that neither the Massachusetts doctrine of privilege nor the
English doctrine of contract based on an expressed or implied reservation of secrecy is sound and that the true basis of the rule barring a
compromise offer is that it is merely an offer to buy peace. In taking this
position, does not the author altogether overlook the practical aspects
of the question? A layman who meets with an adversary in an attempt
to settle their differences is not acquainted with the refinements of
the distinction made by the law between offers and statements, in every
such negotiation there is much give and take, tentative concessions made
to feel out the disposition of the enemy, and the layman should have
the same right to talk "off the record," without his statements being
used against him, that the law gives to his attorney when he is in court.
One of the outstanding merits of Mr. Wigmore's work is his willingness to step in and solve a problem that has been a puzzler for the
courts, by suggesting a common-sense rule to be laid down to fit
that particular situation. An example of this is the problem of whether,
in those jurisdictions that recognize that there are degrees of secondary
evidence, the party desiring to use recollection testimony must consider the better secondary evidence, e.g., a carbon copy, as having the
same sanctity as an original so far as concerns compliance with the
rules relating to the best evidence, proof of loss, notice to produce, etc.
Mr. Wigmore suggests (§ 1268) that the simple solution would be
to let the proponent be required, before offering recollection testimony,
to show that he has not within his control a copy. The suggestion would
seem to be a wise one if to the words "within his control" were added
"and conveniently available." This would take care of the situation
where a party, attending trial in a jurisdiction far from his home,
is unexpectedly confronted with a purported copy of a letter written
by him, of which letter his opponent should have the only original,
6

1
8

60 N. Y. 394 (1875).
253 N. Y. 410, 171 N. E. 690 (1931).
24 Pa. St. 62 (1854).
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and the party is not permitted to show that the document offered is not
a correct copy of the original for the reason that the witness admits on
the stand that he has in his office files at home a carbon copy of the
letter which he wrote. 9
Other illustrations of Mr. Wigmore's willingness to suggest
changes in the law to meet difficult situations are in regard to the presumption of death and in regard to the proof of survivorship in common
disaster cases. In both the first and second editions of his work both
these problems were covered very briefly (§§ 2531, 2532) by merely
a statement as to what the law seemed to be. By 1934, however, Mr.
Wigmore had evidently become convinced that the problems were so
knotty that some effort must be made to straighten them out. Therefore, in his 1934 supplement, he added to his original sections on these
two subjects a number of new paragraphs of text and he suggested
certain model statutes to remedy the difficulties. In this third edition he
is able to report that the most important of his suggestions have now
been embodied in proposed uniform acts,10 which it is hoped will have
general adoption.
In the prior editions, at the conclusion of his discussion of the exceptions to the hearsay rule, he had a very short paragraph (§ 1427)
as to the future of such exceptions, contenting himself with the one
suggestion that the hearsay rule be liberalized to admit all statements
of deceased persons. In this third edition he elaborates at length upon
the subject matter of that section, discussing the proposals made for
codification of the law. He finally suggests the adoption of a very broad
rule of court that the hearsay rule need not be enforced, if, in the
opinion of the trial court, its strict enforcement would needlessly interrupt the narrative of the witness and if the hearsay incidentally testified
to would not be likely to mislead the jury; also that any written statement, duly authenticated, by a person not called to the stand may be
introduced without calling him, unless, in the opinion of the court, the
statement is of such importance that, on demand of the opposite party,
the person should be called for cross examination.
In his chapter on official statements as an exception to the hearsay
rule, the author has inserted two new sections (§§ 1638, 1638a) pro9
That actually happened in a fairly recent Michigan case, Baroda State Bank
v. Peck, 235 Mich. 542, 209 N. W. 827 (1926).
10
Uniform Absence as Evidence of Death and Absentees' Property Act, adopted
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1939. Uniform Simultaneous Death Act, adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws in 1940.
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posing simplification and enlargement of the principle and suggesting
a proposed statute or court rule codifying the subject.
He concludes his chapter on the burden of proof by a thoughtful
discussion (§ 2498a) of the future treatment of the rules on that subject and proposes a somewhat lengthy court rule to clarify and simplify the traditional practice as to the burden of proof and the use
of presumptions.
In his second edition, Mr. Wigmore added a section ( § 8a) entitled "Shortcomings of the Law of Evidence and Its Future." The
title of this section has, in the third edition, been changed to "Present
and Future of the Law of Evidence," and the discussion has been
greatly enlarged, now covering nearly fifty pages. In these pages he
discusses very frankly the qualities of current judicial decisions, in
general and in the law of evidence, the progress of the law and the law
makers and the faults and needs of the rules of evidence, both in general
and in particular. This discussion is, in some respects, the most important part of the work, in its suggestions of possibilities for improvement
in the law, for the reader feels that every word there written has been
the result of deep consideration and the careful thought and rich experience of the author, extending over fifty years, in teaching, thinking,
and writing in this, his chosen field. It is encouraging to observe that
this particular section ends on a note of optimism. Having seen what
he has already accomplished in the way of reform in this field of the
law, Mr. Wigmore can well look with optimism toward a continued
extension of the movement for reform, started by Bentham so many
years ago and renewed and carried on by Mr. Wigmore as no other
man could have done it.

